1972, when Jennett and Plum1 wrote their paper 'Persistent vegetative state after brain damage: a syndrome in search of a name'". Twenty years were to pass before it entered common language, when the High Court, the Appeal Court and the Law Lords agreed to the legality of withdrawing tube feeding from Tony Bland, who had sustained severe anoxic brain damage after being crushed in crowd panic at the Hillsborough football ground disaster in 1989. Since then ten other cases have been referred to the courts for withdrawal of tube feeding. This concept of discontinuing treatment from someone with a life expectancy of several decades has caused much debate about end-of-life ethical issues and is seen by some as a step towards euthanasia. To understand the ethical implications of the vegetative state it is necessary to consider the terminology and clinical outcome. TERMINOLOGY Jennett and Plum's term persistent vegetative state described a specific syndrome of reflex activity without any meaningful response to the environment, in patients with a sleep awake pattern.
Today the term 'vegetative' is widely disliked. Although acceptable in scientific terms ('growing or having the power of growing' or 'affecting, arising from, or relating to involuntary bodily functions'2), in lay terms its association with 'vegetable-like' is unfortunate. However, attempts to change it-for example, to post-comatose unawareness state3-have been unsuccessful.
There has also been confusion over the terms persistent and permanent vegetative state, especially since both tend to be shortened to PVS. Persistent vegetative state is usually applied to the condition between one month and one year and permanent vegetative state when it has lasted longer than one year. The word permanent does not signify that recovery is impossible-only that the statistical chance of further recovery is very small. This is an important issue when we discuss the removal of artificial nutrition and hydration. The Royal College of Physicians4, in setting guidelines on the vegetative state, suggested that the term 'persistent' be replaced by 'continuing'.
MAKING THE DIAGNOSIS
To determine that a patient's eyes open is straightforward; to accept that a response fits with known reflex patterns is relatively clear; but to decide that there is no meaningful response is wide open to different interpretations5. The only way any of us can demonstrate our awareness is by some motor act. A person with severe neurological disabilities that affect motor responses can face enormous difficulties in demonstrating awareness. In our own unit5, 40% of those admitted with a diagnosis of vegetative state were found to have been misdiagnosed, some for several years. The main feature contributing to the misdiagnosis was blindness or severe visual impairment (60%) together with profound physical disablement.
Experience in the Profound Brain Damage Unit at the Royal Hospital for Neuro-disability indicates that several criteria need to be met in making the diagnosis of vegetative state. The first is that the patient should be generally healthy. Maintenance of good nutrition is essential (percutaneous gastrostomy feeding has transformed nutritional management and greatly decreased the risk of chest infections associated with nasogastric feeding); control of urinary tract infections has been made easier by removal of indwelling urinary catheters; and the better management of bowel activity has decreased infections and the complications of impaction of faeces.
The second principle is that patients should be assessed out of bed in a well supporting seating system, which will usually have been specifically designed to meet their needs. Patients tend to be more alert when sitting up, perhaps because the reticular system is then activated; moreover, if a good supportive seating system is supplied, muscle tone is more easily controlled, thereby releasing whatever function the patient has to enable him or her to communicate, for instance by pressing a buzzer.
The final element is that the assessment is conducted by a skilled team, without over-stimulation (sensory regulation is more important than sensory stimulation). The team exploits windows of opportunity and the assessment is carried out for short intervals during the day but over a period of time (usually 4-6 weeks). Clearly the main elements are experience and time. The diagnosis cannot be made on a one-off assessment at the bedside by even the most eminent neurologist.
PROGNOSIS
Central to the ethical debate about the vegetative state is an understanding of the outcome. In the first six months mortality is high, gradually decreasing over the next six months and levelling off thereafter. Life expectancy depends very much on the attitude of the family and clinicians-i.e. how long the patient is allowed to live rather than how long he can live. Some take the attitude that intervening infections should not be treated whereas others insist on maintenance of good health. A decade or two ago, survival to 10 years was unusual; now it is common. The longest survivor on record is a woman in the USA who has been vegetative for over 40 years. Although emergence from the vegetative state is very rare after nine months, there are reports of people emerging as long as five years after the original brain damage. Can technology help?
Electroencephalograms and scans (computed tomography or magnetic resonance) cannot be diagnostic but they may be supportive of the diagnosis. There is some hope that the new functional magnetic resonance scans will make an important contribution to the diagnosis though this has yet to be investigated formally.
ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS
The fundamental principles of ethical decision making (beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy and justice6) create particular challenges in the vegetative state. The beneficence/malificence debate is seen in the discussion about best interests whilst 'autonomy' creates the need for a discussion of advance directives.
The first ethical question is, 'Is there any need to do other than provide high level care for as long as the person might live?'. Much of the debate over withdrawal of tube feeding has been whether it is in the patient's best interest to continue living. Indeed one point raised is whether the patient has any interest in living or dying. When people are asked in surveys whether they would want to continue living in the vegetative state, the overwhelming majority say no. Another argument is that to have tubes inserted and all personal functions dealt with by others is an assault on the patient's dignity if not physical being. To maintain such a meaningless life, therefore, is not showing respect for the individual. Still others argue that to prolong such meaningless life is futile treatment and therefore unethical. It is also argued that few people would wish to put their families through this trauma of having lost the 'person' but still There are, of course, arguments in favour of prolonging life. One is that all life is of value, and life that is lost is lost for ever. A second is that we cannot be absolutely certain that the person is unaware-especially in view of reports of misdiagnosis and lack of expert assessment of patients. Those who oppose withdrawal of tube feeding also point to cases of late recovery, the most pertinent being that of another young man in the Hillsborough football ground disaster who began emerging from the vegetative state five years after the anoxic brain damage and is now able to communicate with a touch-sensitive buzzer switch. Concern is also expressed that permanency of brain damage is based on present day treatment whereas there may be new developments around the corner, such as electrical stimulation of the brain and brain stem, or drugs which may release some unrecognized potential.
One of the dilemmas for the clinician is the statistical level at which risk of a 'wrong' decision can be accepted. For instance, if the risk of the patient emerging from the vegetative state after four years is 1: 10 000, should the 9999 be kept alive to avoid the risk of wrongly withdrawing tube feeding in one person? What if the risk is 1%, 5% and so on?
Supposing, then, we decide that it is not in the patient's best interest to continue living, how does society (whoever that is) wish the life to be ended? There are several clinical options. The first is a 'do-not-resuscitate' policy for the patient. This, however, has considerable limitations as an option for an otherwise healthy young person. The second option is not to treat intercurrent medical or surgical disorders. Withholding treatment seems, for some reason, more acceptable to the medical profession than withdrawal of treatment (tube feeding in this case)-probably because death can be ascribed to natural causes rather than an action by the clinician. Since the endpoint is the same, this can be seen as an artificial distinction.
The third option is not to treat ongoing medical disorders-for example, diabetes or life-threatening, epilepsy. Few clinicians seem willing to take this action, though how it differs from non-treatment of a chest infection is not obvious.
The fourth option is to withdraw tube feeding, and the fifth is euthanasia. In English law euthanasia is illegal, and it has not found favour with the House of Lords Ethical Committee or the British Medical Association. On the other hand, withdrawal of nutrition and hydration has been accepted in law, provided (for the time being at least) each case comes before the courts for a judicial directive. Many argue that withdrawal of nutrition and hydration is in effect euthanasia, though in this case carried out without the patient's permission.
Withdrawal of tube feeding presents dilemmas to having the 'body' and therefore being unable to grieve. clinicians even if they approve of the principle. The first is whether feeding is to be regarded as 'treatment' or 'care': if it is 'treatment', consideration can be given to withholding or withdrawing it; if it is care then it cannot be withdrawn. The usual view is that provision of nutrition is care. Nearly all of the arguments revolve around whether tube ('artificial') feeding is treatment. In the Tony Bland case the argument was heard that tube feeding is treatment that the food needs a prescription (which it does not), that the tube, nasogastric in the case of Tony Bland, needs professional skills to insert (families had been known to replace them though this is less likely for gastrostomy tubes) and that nutrition has to be supervised by a dietician (preferred but not essential). However, a wide body of the medical profession seems to accept the argument that the tube is treatment and can therefore be judged on medical grounds as futile or not.
A treatment is futile if it has no benefit or desired effect. In the vegetative state, tube feeding clearly achieves the objective of maintaining normal tissues in a good nutritional and healthy state. The food was not expected to have any direct curative effect on the damaged brain-only to provide optimal nutrition to those parts still living. The second form of futile treatment is when the treatment is having an effect but the side-effects are too damaging. This is not the case in tube feeding in the vegetative state, unless maintenance of life is regarded as a side-effect. The third form of futility is where the treatment would be effective but other conditions (e.g. terminal cancer) make treatment futile. In the case of tube feeding this again is not applicable. One argument that has been put forward is that the feeding tube was inserted for a trial treatment period to see if recovery occurred. If there is no recovery then the treatment (tube feeding) has failed and can therefore be discontinued.
It can, therefore, be argued that food as a specific 'treatment' is meeting the objectives set for its use. The argument has then progressed to the more generalized nature of food as treatment, in that it was not achieving or aiding the recovery of the patient. There are two elements here. One is the concept that clinical management is about recovery-in practice much of our work in medicine is about damage limitation and maintenance of the status quo. The second, and more important, is that what was being considered was not the futility of the treatment but the futility of a life.
Conditions that might be judged to make life futile include uncontrollable pain, severe distress (such as continuous nausea) and uncontrollable depression. All of these can be considered as causing positive distress; but can lack of awareness, and therefore lack of distress, be put in the same category? The debate about futility of a life is not directly a medical one, being based on personal moral ences in life. Nevertheless, the medical profession is caught in the middle and has to make decisions from day to day. Even for those who accept the principle of withdrawing tube feeding, participation in the act is not easy. It requires great personal strength to support the caring staff, both in preparing for withdrawal of the tube and in coping with what follows.
THE WEDGE
The debate did not end with the Tony Bland case. Those expressing the view that this is the 'thin edge of the wedge' have been accused of scaremongering: the vegetative state, they are assured, is so specific that there is no danger of progressing to more aware patients. However, there have been attempts to seek similar directives for patients who are not vegetative but in the minimally conscious state. Once that principle is accepted, then are demented elderly people at risk, or those with profound neurological disabilities? Are we on the verge of a major change in medical thinking on the care of some of the most vulnerable people in our society?
In all of this debate I have avoided a utilitarian discussion-largely because the courts have always made clear that financial resources are not an issue in seeking directives for withdrawal of tube feeding. Nevertheless, some would say that scarcity of resources is very much an argument for withdrawal of tube feeding. If this is accepted, then what other groups of patients are going to have their 'treatment' stopped because of the allocation? As a profession, and indeed as members of society, we need to be clear in our arguments, whichever side of the debate we support. Unfortunately, evidence-based medicine is of little help.
Some other issues have received less attention than they deserve. For instance, if it is in a patient's best interest that tube feeding should be withdrawn where does this leave the doctor whose personal moral code forbids tube withdrawal? To refuse to remove the tube would be acting against his patient's best interests and therefore, presumably, illegal. Whilst such a doctor should in theory pass the patient's care onto another doctor, in practice this is not easily achieved since few doctors want to accept a new patient primarily for the purpose of removing the tube. Indeed, discussion of tube removal in these practical terms challenges our own moral thinking even if we believe in the principle. Why should we be reluctant to accept a patient for what is regarded as management in his or her best interests? Another issue is the conundrum, if it was in Tony Bland's best interest to have the tube withdrawn, is the decision equally applicable to all vegetative patients? Does philosophy, cultural and religious background and experi-595 this mean that for clinical teams and families to keep any of these patients alive is to act against the patient's best interests? The logical conclusion of this argument is that all patients diagnosed in the permanent vegetative state should have their tube feeding withdrawn. Although at present the courts forbid tube withdrawal from a vegetative patient in the absence of a court directive, this is seen to be a temporary measure until there is a sufficient body of case law, or clinical guidelines, to ensure that the process is examined in detail. If the diagnosis is correct, the other arguments about best interests will almost automatically follow.
